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VI.

CONCLUSION

This law places a heavy burden on the owner without regard to the
extent of the improvement he is making. It is inequitable in making the
owner an insurer of the honesty and solvency of the contractor, even
though he has no control over personnel, conditions of employment, or
purchase of materials. The failure of any other state to enact this law
reveals a general disapproval of its policy. Much of the objection to
the law might be obviated if its operation were restricted to the larger
transactions and another lien law passed adjusting more equitably the
rights of parties involved in less extensive improvements.
GEORGE

0.

PRINGLE

ESTATES BY THE ENTIRETY: CREATION BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE
In May of 1928, Alfred Johnson, holding fee simple title to nonhomestead property in severalty, desired to create an estate by the
entirety. Thereupon, as grantor, he conveyed by warranty deed to
himself dnd wife as co-grantees. Subsequently he devised the same
property to his son. Alfred Johnson died in 1935. Upon administration of the wife's estate four years later, the administrator petitioned for
a declaratory decree construing the effect of the deed. The circuit court
held the deed effectual to create an estate by the entirety. An appeal
to the supreme court terminated in an affirmance of the judgment of
the court below, the result of an evenly divided court.' The decision
in this case is illustrative of a controversy which has resounded in the
courts of many states since the advent of married women's property acts
and the removal of the inhibition against direct conveyances between the
2
spouses.

'Johnson v. Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939).
'See cases cited infra notes 17, 18, 20, 21, 23.
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An enactment of the 1947 Legislature has partially resolved the doubt
created by the decision in Johnson v. Landefeld.3 An amendment to
Florida Statutes 1941, Sec. 689.11 (Supp. 1947), 4 provides that an estate
by the entirety may be created by deed from one spouse to the other
in which the purpose to create such an estate is recited. 5 An examination
of the amendment raises the problem of how to accomplish a deed of
conveyance that will secure the intended result. More specifically, the
problem is twofold: (1) who is to be named grantee; and (2) what
interest is to be conveyed? The problem may be illustrated by a hypothetical set of facts: A holds fee simple title to Blackacre in severalty.
He desires to create an estate by the entirety pursuant to the amendment.
He has the following alternatives: (1) to convey the fee simple to his
wife, or (2) to convey an undivided interest to his wife, or perhaps (3)
to convey the fee simple to himself and his wife. The first two alternatives more nearly satisfy the letter of the amendment, while the third
alternative would seem equally within the spirit of the amendment though
not its letter. Unfortunately, the legislature did not contemplate this
procedural problem. The only requirement stipulated is that the deed
should contain a recitation of purpose to create an estate by the entirety.
In view of this, it is possible, or probable, that any deed conveying an
interest from one spouse to the other and containing this requisite statement of purpose will be sustained. In the absence of statute, there is
considerable difference in the legal effect of the alternative conveyances
suggested. An examination of the cases will indicate this, although they
are not all in accord.
By the common law an estate by the entirety arises whenever an interest in land is conveyed or devised to a man and his wife. 6 It is not
3

Johnson v. Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939).
'... An estate by the entirety may be created by the spouse holding fee simple
title conveying to the other by a deed in which the purpose to create such estate is
stated."

'The phrases "tenancy by the entirety," "estate by the entirety," and variations
of these are used interchangeably. It would seem that "estate by the entirety" is
a contracted form of expressing "an estate held by tenants by the entirety" or "an
estate held by the entirety." "By the entirety" refers to the mode of ownership and
has no reference to quantum of estate.
6
Doe d. Freestone v. Parratt, 5 T. R. 652, 101 Eng. Rep. 363 (1794) ; 2 BL. CoMM.
*182; Co. LiTT. *187. At least in the absence of an expressed intention to the contrary.
CHALLIS, REAL PROPERTY *305 (1887); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §431 (3d ed.
1939); accord, Knapp v. Fredricksen, 148 Fla. 311, 4 So.2d 251 (1941); Menendez v.
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necessary that the conveyance recite that they are man and wife, nor
is it necessary that the conveyance express that they should take as
tenants by the entirety. 7 It has been said that a conveyance that would
make two other persons joint tenants would, if the same conveyance were
made to man and wife, make them tenants by the entirety.8 The
husband and wife, in contemplation of law, are one person, 9 and title by
such a conveyance devolves upon the spouses as a single entity. Thus,
in addition to the requisite unities of time, title, interest, and possession
necessary to a joint tenancy, a tenancy by the entirety has a fifth unity,
that of person.'o Since the title devolves on them as one, both are seised
of the entire estate and not by moieties;"1 hence the consequence that
neither the husband nor the wife can dispose of any part without the
assent of the other.' 2 Since at common law the husband could not
convey directly to the wife, whenever the husband held title to real property in severalty and desired to create an estate by the entirety, he could
do so only by conveying to a third person, or trustee, who would thereupon
reconvey to both spouses. The elimination of this circuitous method was
the motive for attempting to accomplish this purpose by direct conveyance.
The cases that have adjudicated attempts by the husband and wife
to create an estate by the entirety by direct conveyance fall into two
categories: (1) those in which the husband, or wife, having title in
severalty, has conveyed an undivided half interest to the other spouse, and
(2) those in which the husband, or wife, having title in severalty, has
3
conveyed the fee to both spouses as co-grantees.'

Rodriguez, 106 Fla. 214, 143 So. 223 (1932).
7See note 6 supra; accord, Matthews v. McCain, 125 Fla. 840, 170 So. 323 (1936).
8CHALLis, REAL PROPERTY

*303 (1887).

'2 BL. Co

. *182; accord, Hunt v. Covington, 145 Fla. 706, 200 So. 76 (1941).
102 TIF=ANY, REAr PROPERTY §430 (3d ed. 1939); accord, Andrews v. Andrews,
155 Fla. 654, 21 So.2d 205 (1945). The unities of time and title require that the
title of the husband and wife arise by the same conveyance and vest at the same time.
24 THOmpSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 1804 (perm. ed. 1940) ; accord, Bailey v. Smith,
89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925). Hence the description, "tenants by (of) the entirety."
It is this fact that each tenant is seised of the whole estate which makes survivorship
inapplicable to the tenancy.'
2
Doe d. Freestone v. Parratt, 5 T. R. 652, 101 Eng. Rep. 363 (1794); Back v.
Andrew, 2 Vern. 121, 23 Eng. Rep. 687 (1690); 2 BL. COMM. *182; Co. LIr. *187b;
accord, Richart v. Roper, 156 Fla. 822, 25 So.2d 80 (1946).
"'The deeds in both categories contained expressions of intent to create an estate
by the entirety. Some of the cases adjudicating deeds in either category involve the
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In Pegg v. Pegg,1 4 the court considered the validity of a deed in
HELD, the deed did not satisfy the unities of time and
category (1).
title requisite to an estate by the entirety. Similarly, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in the case In re Walker's Estate,' 5 reached the same

conclusion.' 6
7
Hicks v. Sprankle' involved a deed in the second category. HELD,
8
and the husband as sole capable
the wife could not convey to herself,'
9
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of New
grantee took the fee.'

creation of joint tenancies rather than tenancies by the entirety. Generally, these
cases have arisen in states where tenancy by the entirety does not obtain. Since most
of the questions involving the creation of either of these tenancies by conveyance
between the spouses are similar, these cases have been included.
"165 Mich. 228, 130 N. W. 617 (1911).
340 Pa. 13, 16 A.2d 28 (1940).
"Contra: In re Farrand, 126 Misc. 590, 214 N. Y. Supp. 793 (1926); In re
Horler's Estate, 180 App. Div. 608, 168 N. Y. Supp. 221 (1917) (to create a joint
tenancy), overruling Dressler v. Mulhern, 77 Misc. 476, 136 N. Y. Supp. 1049 (1912).
The New York courts make no attempt to reconcile the obvious insufficiencies of such
deeds in respect to the unities of time and title.
"149 Tenn. 310, 257 S. W. 1044 (1924) (the husband joined in the deed as
grantor).
"Accord, Michigan State Bank v. Kern, 189 Mich. 467, 155 N. W. 502 (1915)
(deed in fraud of creditors, held a tenancy in common created); Wright v. Knapp,
183 Mich. 656, 150 N. W. 315 (1915) (held that the whole fee passed to the other
spouse); Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374, 297 N. W. 595 (1941); Cameron v.
Steves, 4 Allen 141 (N. Brun. Sup. Ct. 1858) (held that the other two capable grantees
took the fee as joint tenants). There are two reasons given for this rule. At early
common law, livery of seisin was necessary to the transfer, or necessary to the vesting,
of a freehold estate in another. The inability of making livery of seisin to oneself
has been suggested as a reason for the rule that a grantor cannot convey to himself.
See Cameron v. Steves, supra. However, upon inspection this does not appear broad
enough to cover the general nature of the prohibition. Livery of seisin was not
necessary in the creation or transfer of an estate less than freehold. Further, if it
were merely the inability of making livery of seisin to oneself, a conveyance by
A "to B for life, remainder to A and the heirs male of his body" would appear to
surmount this obstacle, since livery of seisin need only be made to B. Yet this was
prohibited. Pibus v. Mitford, 1 Vent. 372 (1674). The paramount reason was that
a person could not take as purchaser from himself, thereby acquiring a new title
and breaking the line of descent of the property. 1 LEAxE, DIGEST OF Trm LAW
OF PROPERTY IN LAND 51 (1874). By the Inheritance Act, 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 106,
§3 (1833), this rule was abrogated to permit a grantor to convey to himself to alter the
line of descent of his property. This act was Inter repealed.
"If for any reason one of several joint gi.ntees is incapable of taking, the other
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Jersey in Cadgene v. Cadgene,2 0 involving similar facts, sustained the
validity of a deed to create an estate by the entirety. In reaching this
21
decision the Court relied on the reasoning of In re Klatzl's Estate, to
the effect that a conveyance from one spouse to both spouses does not
conflict with the rule that a grantor cannot convey to himself. 22 Later
-NewYork decisions appear to proceed on the reasoning that the grantor
spouse does not take as grantee, but the effect of the deed is to reserve
an interest to him equal to that conveyed to the wife. 2 3 The affirming
opinion in Johnson v. Landefeld24 follows this view. 2 5

shall take the whole. Dowset v. Sweet, 1 Amb. Rep. 175, 27 Eng. Rep. 117 (1753);
Humphrey v. Tayleur, 1 Amb. Rep. 136, 27 Eng. Rep. 89 (1752); Bagwell v. Dry,
1 P. Wins. 700, 24 Eng. Rep. 577 (1721). The reason for the rule seems to be that
each joint tenant has a benefit by the gifts to the others because of the possibility
that the others' shares may accrue to him by survivorship. Thus, to give him only his
share, when one of the other joint devisees or grantees is incapable of taking, would
deprive him of a contingent benefit conferred by the devise or conveyance. This
reasoning was of greater force before the statutes of 31 Hen. VIII, c. 1, and 32
Hen. VIII, c. 32, which conferred on joint tenants the power to compel partition.
While a tenancy by the entirety differs from a joint tenancy, yet the reason for the
rule would seem applicable, for each such tenant becomes seised of the entire estate
by the conveyance or devise, and it is merely the other tenant's share of the usufruct
which is the contingent benefit. To give the sole capable tenant less than the entire
estate would be to deprive that tenant of part of the estate intended to be vested in
him (or her) by the conveyance.
017 N. J. Misc. 332, 8 A.2d 858 (1939).
21216 N. Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181 (1915).
"-The court adopted the reasoning of Justice Collins in that case: "The ownership
it [the deed] devolved was in both grantees as one person . . . . The husband .did
not convey to himself, but to a legal unity which was the consolidation of himself
and another." For an interesting analogy to this reasoning, see Pope v. Brandon,
401 (Ala. 1830).
2 Stew.
22
Coon v. Campbell, 138 Misc. 567, 240 N. Y. Supp. 772 (1930); Boehringer v.
Schmid, 133 Misc. 236, 232 N. Y. Supp. 360 (1928), affd, 228 App. Div. 881, 239 N. Y.
Supp. 922, ajj'd per curiam, 254 N. Y. 355, 173 N. E. (1930); In re Vogelsang's
Estate, 122 Misc. 599, 203 N. Y. Supp. 364 (1924). The New York courts cite
In re Klatzl's Estate, 216 N. Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181 (1915), as establishing this
proposition, but, in fact, it was merely suggested as a basis in the concurring opinion
of Chief Justice Bartlett. Unfortunately, he cited no authority for his statements
nor attempted to explain the rationale of his observations.
24138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939).
25
By common-law rule there are three requisites to a valid reservation: (1) the
thing reserved must be something new, something not in esse before the grant; it is
created by the grant; (2) the thing reserved must issue out of the thing granted.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 9
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
The reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the cases is that, in the
absence of statute, deeds of the first category do not satisfy the incidents
of an estate by the entirety. The reasoning of the cases applies equally
whether the fee, or merely an undivided interest, is conveyed. 2 6 As to
27
deeds in the second category the cases are in definite conflict.
As the letter of the recent amendment contemplates a deed of the

as rent issues out of the land; (3) the reservation must be in favor of the grantor.
Co. Li-r. *47a; 6 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY §3458 (Perm. Ed. 1940); 4 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY §1972 (3d ed. 1939); see Jacksonville v. Shaffer, 107 Fla. 367, 371,
144 So. 888, 890 (1932). The second of these requisites has been abrogated in many
states to allow the reservations of an easement. 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §973
(3d ed. 1939). More recently a number of states have explained the retention of a
life estate in the grantor, when conveying the fee, on the basis of reservation.
4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §972 (3d ed. 1939); see Wise v. Wise, 134 Fla. 553, 564,
184 So. 91, 95 (1938). It is difficult to see how reservation of an interest in the
grantor can satisfy the concept of an estate by the entirety. The title to any interest
which the grantor reserves, i.e., does not convey to the other spouse, is in him
by virtue of the conveyance by which he acquired title, and therefore predates the
title of his spouse. Thus the unities of time and title are lacking. Further, even
assuming the grantor can reserve some new interest, or be said to acquire a new
title to the interest reserved, what interests can he on the one hand convey to his
spouse and on the other reserve to himself which satisfy the concept that each is
seised of the whole by the conveyance? The only such interest is the whole, and
this cannot be conveyed and reserved as well.
2
There have been no cases involving deeds conveying the whole fee from one
spouse to the other. However, the probable effect of such a deed would be to vest
the whole fee in the grantee spouse. The recital of an intent to vest an estate by the
entirety in both spouses would be repugnant to the granting clause conveying the
property to a single grantee.
"If any criticism of the cases as a whole is to be made, it is the peremptory
manner in which some of the courts have applied the rule that a grantor cannot
convey to himself. There is ample ground upon which to question its applicability
to the creation of an estate by the entirety. The concept of the estate is that the
title to the whole is held by both spouses, but this is more accurately stated thus:
Title to the whole is held by the unity or entity which is composed of both spouses.
This is exemplified by the fact that neither spouse can dispose of any part of the
estate without the assent of the other. Both spouses, the unity, must join in the
alienation. This unity is neither the husband nor the wife but a separate entitv,
albeit a legal fiction. If the fiction of conveying to the unity of husband and wife
exists when the title devolves from a third person, why may not the fiction exist
when the title is sought to be devolved upon them by either individual spouse?
Perhaps the courts feel a natural antipathy toward extending a fiction or making it
applicable in another situation. Yet, it is doing no more than giving either spouse the
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first category, it is reasonable to conclude that it impliedly intends an
abrogation of the common-law incidents of the estate which cannot be
satisfied by such a conveyance. The estate by the entirety must arise
by force of statute, and it would seem of little consequence what form
the deed takes, providing the intent of the grantor is clearly expressed.
A safe procedure, and one which circumvents an embarrassing choice,
would be to convey the property to the other spouse, in language substantially as follows: "to grant, bargain, sell, and transfer such interest in
Blackacre as will under the statute create an estate by the entirety."
The amendment raises two other questions: (1) may a spouse having
a life estate or term of years in property create an estate by the entirety
in that interest under the amendment; 28 and (2) may a spouse having
fee simple title to property create an estate by the entirety in a lesser
estate than the fee? As to (1), the wording of the amendment appears
to restrict its operation to situations wherein one of the spouses holds
title in fee simple. 2 9 It may be questioned that the legislature intended
such a restriction, particularly in the absence of any apparent reason
for so doing. The maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" is of
doubtful applicability in this situation. Where the spouse does hold
fee-simple title there is nothing in the amendment to suggest that he
may not so create an estate by the entirety in a lesser estate than the
fee. Generally a person may not have a particular estate in land with
reversion in fee in himself, since the law of merger operates to extinguish
the lesser particular estate.3 0 However, because of the sui generis
character of an estate by the entirety, there is sound reason for asserting
that this rule does not apply. Both tenants by the entirety are seised
right to confer on themselves what any third person may. If at common law
the spouses were one, the legislatures have effectively made them two, and the
courts, in deciding that tenancy by the entirety exists, have surely established that
they are three: the husband, the wife, and the unity. It would seem only in keeping
with the spirit of these decisions and recent legislation to provide that either spouse
may convey to this unity in the same manner as a third person.
"A tenancy by the entirety may exist in any quantum of estate: in fee, in tail,
for life, or for years. It matters not whether the estate be in possession, reversion,
or remainder. 4 THoMPsoN o REAL PROPERTY §331 (perm. ed. 1940). It may also
exist in an equitable estate. Matthews v. McCain, 125 Fla. 840, 170 So. 323 (1936).
the spouse holding fee simple
"FLA. STAT. 1941, §689.11 (Supp. 1947). "...
title conveying to the other ....$
"See the discussions of merger in BL. CoiMf. *177, Co. LITT. *187b, 4 KENT
Co c. 99 (14th ed. 1896).
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of the whole.3 1 There are no moieties as in joint tenancy; the tenants
merely share the usufruct of the estate during their joint lives.32 Upon
the death of one of them the only effect on the estate is that it is
freed from that tenant's participation and the whole of the estate continues
in the survivor by virtue of the original conveyance. 33 Neither tenant
has an alienable interest in the estate in his or her own right.3 4 Thus
the whole particular estate cannot merge, since its owner is neither the
husband nor the wife but the separate legal entity comprised of both
spouses; nor can anything less than the whole particular estate merge,
for neither tenant has such an interest. This situation is within the rule
35
expressed by Chancellor Kent.
It is unfortunate that the legislature did not adopt an enactment
similar to the Uniform Interparty Agreement Act 3 0 now in force in
several states. 3 7 The present amendment is certainly commendable in
that it is in keeping with the spirit of modern legislation in giving husband
and wife more freedom in dealing with their property in respect to
transfers between themselves. It gives them the right to confer on
themselves an estate which any third person may so confer upon them.
It also eliminates a bothersome circuituity of conveyancing. The creation
of an estate by the entirety by conveyance from one spouse to the other
offers a logical anomaly, however. By this method the estate arises
without some of the incidents which distinguish it: the unities of time
and title. At the same time, this estate created by deed from a third
person has all the recognized incidents. Equally anomalous is the fact
that whatever the interest conveyed to the "other spouse," whether the
fee or an undivided half interest, both spouses are to become seised of
the whole, for this is the fundamental concept of the estate.
"1Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925).
"4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY §1803 (perm. ed. 1940).
3

Ibid.

"4See note 12 supra.
""The power of alienation must extend to the one estate as well as to the other, in
order to allow the merger ....
" 4 KENT COMM. 102 (14th ed. 1896).
'"9 U. L. A. 425. This act was redesignated a Model Act in 1943.
87
Maryland, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Utah. Two other states, Massachusetts
and Rhode Island, have similar enactments. The act in substance permits a person
to convey to himself and another jointly. Two states have held the act broad enough
to allow an estate by the entirety to be created pursuant to its terms. In re Vandergrift, 105 Pa. 293, 161 Atl. 898 (1932) ; Lawton v. Lawton, 48 R. 1. 134, 136 Atl. 241
(1927). Contra: Ames v. Chandler, 265 Mass. 428, 164 N. E. 616 (1929) (held that
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The most logical way to secure the benefit which the amendment seeks
to confer is to permit the spouse holding title in severalty to convey to
both spouses as co-grantees. The only impediment advanced against the
creation of an estate by the entirety in this way is the rule, logically
irrelevant in a conveyance by one spouse to a separate and distinct legal
entity, that a grantor cannot convey to himself. 3 8 Once the rule is clearly
analyzed and accordingly distinguished, a conveyance from one spouse
to both spouses satisfies all the requisites of the estate.3 9 While such a
conveyance is within the spirit of the amendment, it is regrettably not
within its letter.
GEoRGE

H. DE CARION

APPELLATE REVIEW OF HABEAS CORPUS IN FLORIDA
Until April 1, 1942, when the present Florida Supreme Court Rules
of Practice became effective, appellate review of proceedings at law in
a lower court was invoked by'writ of error, except in those instances in
which certiorari or prohibition would be appropriate or for which there
was other express provision of law. 1 Appeal was not allowed in any law
procedure. 2
Rule 2 of the Supreme Court of Florida abolishes relief by writ of
error and provides that all relief formerly obtained by that writ shall
henceforth be sought by appeal, as in equity. Return days of appeals
have likewise been abolished, and the filing of a notice of appeal with
the clerk of the lower court now gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction
of the subject-matter and the parties.3
the wife was not "another person" within the statute).
:'See note 27 supra.
'Cadgene v. Cadgene, 17 N. J. Misc. 332, 8 A.2d 858 (1939); In re Klatzl's Estate,
216 N. Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181 (1915); In re Vandergrift, 105 Pa. 293, 161 At. 898
(1932); Lawton v. Lawton, 48 R. I. 134, 136 AUt. 241 (1927).
'FLA. STAT. 1941, §59.01; Pleasant Valley Farms v. Carl, 90 Fla. 420, 106 So. 427

(1925).
'Trabue v. Williams, 46 Fla. 228, 35 So. 872 (1903); Montgomery v. Thomas, 40
Fla. 450, 25 So. 62 (1899).
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